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Disinformation Centre: Kremlin Targets Europe Using the Same Playbook as Before the Invasion of Ukraine

The Centre compared Russian information campaigns against Ukraine on the eve of the full-scale war with those targeting six European countries in 2026.

Disinformation Centre: Kremlin Targets Europe Using the Same Playbook as Before the Invasion of Ukraine
Росіяни нагородили пропагандистів з тимчасово окупованих територій України
Photo: EPA/UPG

Russian propaganda is using the same models of information pressure against European countries as it deployed against Ukraine before the full-scale invasion. This includes portraying defensive measures as a threat to Russia, accusing governments of oppressing Russian-speaking communities, and claiming that Orthodox Christians are being persecuted.

This is evidenced by a study by the National Security and Defence Council’s Centre for Countering Disinformation.

Analysts compared material from Russian sources about Ukraine over the 100 days before the invasion — from 14 November 2021 to 21 February 2022 — with publications about Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland over the period from 20 July to 27 October 2026.

According to the analysis, three core models of information pressure recurred in both samples. At the same time, in material about European countries the accusations mostly appeared in response to specific government decisions, officials’ statements, border incidents and legislative initiatives.

Defensive measures are portrayed as a threat. On the eve of the invasion, Russian media accused Ukraine of preparing an offensive in Donbas, while Russia itself was building up its military presence near Ukraine’s borders, in occupied Crimea, in the Black and Azov Seas, and in Belarus.

In 2026, Russian sources used similar rhetoric towards European states. Strengthening defence, border protection and the presence of allied forces were presented as provocations, militarisation and preparations to attack Russia.

The pretexts differed by country: in Norway the focus was mainly on the Arctic and maritime activity; in Finland, on the eastern border and co-operation with NATO; in the Baltic states, on airspace and border incidents; and in Poland, on security near the Ukrainian border and the defence of the Alliance’s eastern flank.

Language policy is described as oppression of Russian speakers. In Ukraine, the trigger for such accusations was the planned implementation of language legislation. In particular, on 16 January 2022 requirements came into force regarding Ukrainian-language print runs for nationwide and regional printed media. Russian sources described these rules as a “ban on the Russian language”, “forced Ukrainisation”, “ethnocide” and “language apartheid”.

In 2026, similar accusations were voiced in relation to education and language decisions in the Baltic states.

In Estonia and Latvia, the transition of schools to the state language of instruction was presented as discrimination against Russian-speaking pupils; in Lithuania, changes to the school curriculum were framed as oppression of Russian speakers. In Latvia, the pretext also included requirements for some Russian citizens to demonstrate knowledge of Latvian in order to retain the right of permanent residence.

In Norway, Finland and Poland, the language theme was less prominent. Instead, Russian sources more often labelled visa and property restrictions, sanctions and border-control measures as “Russophobia”.

Religious disputes are framed as persecution of Orthodox Christians. In Ukraine, Russian media and Moscow Patriarchate structures portrayed parishes switching to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and disputes over the use of churches as “persecution of the faith”, “forceful seizures of churches” and state interference in church affairs.

Among European countries, the clearest parallels with Ukraine’s experience were recorded in Estonia and Lithuania. There, discussions focused on the legal status of Orthodox organisations and their links to the Moscow Patriarchate. In Latvia, Russian sources also covered legislation formalising the independence of the local Orthodox Church from church authorities outside the country, though there were few such items.

In Finland and Norway, religious issues remained largely marginal. In Poland, Russian sources focused on an attack at a Catholic monastery in Yaroslav.

The content of propaganda material varied depending on the local political, security and humanitarian context.

Norway. The main focus was on security in the Arctic and NATO military activity. Strengthening defence and maritime presence were presented as militarisation of the region and a threat to Russia. Visa and sanctions decisions, as well as the detention of vessels in Svalbard, were interpreted as discrimination against Russian citizens.

Finland. Criticism of border and security policy predominated. The closure of border crossing points, restrictions on Russians entering the country and property checks were presented as manifestations of Russophobia and discrimination.

Estonia. Russian sources combined criticism of defence policy with themes of language and religious discrimination. The transition of schools to Estonian as the language of instruction was described as oppression of Russian speakers, while demands to end organisational ties between the local Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchate were framed as persecution of believers.

Latvia. Russian publications mocked defensive measures and questioned the circumstances of border incidents. Language requirements, including the transition of public broadcasting to Latvian, were presented as a total ban on the Russian language.

Lithuania. Strengthening defence, the issue of transit to the Kaliningrad region and airspace violations were presented as provocations and escalation by Vilnius. Changes to the education programme for pupils from the Russian national minority were interpreted as Russophobia, while some Orthodox clergy distancing themselves from the Moscow Patriarchate was framed as persecution of the Church.

Poland. Statements about strengthening defence and reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank were used to shape an image of the country as a threat to Russia. Certain legal decisions affecting Russians were presented as discrimination. On religious issues, Russian sources covered the attack on a Catholic monastery in Yaroslav, emphasising the suspect’s Ukrainian citizenship and using this to spread anti-Ukrainian sentiment.

Russian sources published the largest number of military and political items about Lithuania and Poland within a single week — from 14 to 20 September 2026. In Lithuania’s case, more than 3,500 publications were recorded during that period, and in Poland’s, more than 6,000.

Among the pretexts for material about Poland were Russia’s strike on a passenger train in Volyn near the Polish border and statements by Polish officials about security. In particular, Russian sources presented remarks by Poland’s Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski about a possible NATO response to a Russian attack as a threat from Warsaw.

In Lithuania, one of the triggers for publications was a violation of the country’s airspace.

Analysts also identified differences in audience reactions across platforms. For example, in Norway nine TikTok videos accounted for only 2.7% of publications about the rights of Russian speakers, but generated 91.2% of all reactions on the topic.

Common to both periods studied was the logic of the accusations: defensive measures were presented as a threat to Russia, rules affecting specific groups as oppression of all Russian speakers, and church disputes as persecution of Orthodox Christians.

At the same time, the context in which these messages spread differed. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, Russia was concentrating troops near Ukraine’s borders, denying any intention to attack while simultaneously accusing Kyiv of escalating the situation. In 2026, material about European states mostly appeared in response to specific decisions and incidents.

The publication dynamics also differed. In the Ukrainian sample, the largest number of items on each of the three themes appeared within a single week — from 14 to 20 February 2022. This took place against the backdrop of Russian troops massing near Ukraine, reports of alleged sabotage, and escalation along the line of contact.

In the European samples, peaks fell in different periods, although in Poland and Lithuania the largest number of military and political items was also published within a single week — in September 2026.

Analysts described Poland and Lithuania as particularly illustrative. In Polish material, Russian sources shifted responsibility for tensions onto Warsaw and presented defensive statements as threats. In Lithuanian material, parallels with Ukraine’s experience could be traced across all three areas: defensive measures were portrayed as preparations for war, changes to the school curriculum as oppression of Russian speakers, and proposals concerning church property as persecution of Orthodox Christians.

The Centre notes that, based on Ukraine’s experience, it is worth continuing to monitor the dynamics of Russian publications about Poland and Lithuania. It was precisely in relation to these countries that the highest weekly figures for military and political material were recorded during the period studied. In addition, for Lithuania, parallels with Ukraine’s experience were evident across all three themes.

Analysts advise paying particular attention to whether the number of publications about Poland or Lithuania increases simultaneously across all three areas. If such growth is sustained, it is important to determine whether the same accusations are being repeated under different pretexts and whether Russian officials are using them to justify the use of force.

This combination of signs may be one of the signals of information preparation for possible aggression. At the same time, conclusions about Russia’s intentions to attack should be based not only on analysis of information materials, but also on independent data on military preparations and diplomatic steps.

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