The United Kingdom is one of our key partners in the Old World — in the supply of air defence systems, work with drones, etc. How else could military cooperation be strengthened?
First of all, thank you for the invitation. I am extremely pleased to speak from the position of ambassador.
Returning to the United Kingdom and our cooperation in the defence sector... In fact, I do not renounce what I said back in 2023–2024. Let us imagine a situation where the war continues, we come to our partners and say: 'Help us. Here is a list of what we need.' And our partners, looking at this list, will say, 'What is this?' It is obvious that they remain, unfortunately, in the strategic paradigm of World War II and its aftermath.
I will repeat myself: there will be no war like the one on 24 February 2022. Because the more countries we involve in our technological process, the more it will guarantee us a truly reliable partner in the future who can help.
Although in reality, the situation is very interesting because national interests are still at the heart of any international relations. What is the national interest for the United Kingdom, for example, in investing huge amounts of money in the development of unmanned aviation if it loses the product it has released — they are not going to put it in their warehouse, are they? In other words, this is work for the future. There is only one prospect for the United Kingdom — to enter the technological process and preserve this latest technology.
Britain can do this because it has: a) funds; b) technological capabilities. Yes, they are expensive today. But as a result of their involvement in our technological process, such products will become cheaper. But, let's say, this is already a problem for the United Kingdom.

We desperately need a reliable partner and to involve them in the technological process. So that in a year's time, we know for sure that we have allies who can produce the weapons we will need in a year's time.
Another point of interest is that all new or simply upgraded weapons in Ukraine are tested immediately on the battlefield.
This must be approached with great care. Because any country we mention is mainly a NATO country. And it is still a huge mistake on NATO's part to believe that this banal re-equipment will be a magic wand that will come to their rescue at any moment. And I say, ‘No.’
No, because new weapons entail new tactics of use, new forms and methods of use. New forms and methods of use entail new structures in which they are used. As a result, there is a need for a new doctrine of use, a new training system, and new funding. For any NATO country, this takes about five years.
And whoever is the first to come up with this technology today, so that they can return to re-equipment in the future, will be on top. That is their main interest.
Do not forget that NATO has its own doctrine — a doctrine of application, a doctrine of development, a doctrine of development policy, and so on. And it does not coincide at all with the new technological processes that are currently on the battlefield.

On the other hand, the Old World openly admits that it is preparing for a major war. Most politicians who speak about this publicly still lean towards the model that has just been mentioned and which is irrelevant — à la World War II. The closest date they mention is 30 years. But if the likely war does follow the scenario of World War II, this five-year gap could be decisive.
Absolutely. If they join the process today, it will be in five years. But for at least a year and a half, I have been watching how this ‘today’ should come for them, but it has not yet come.
Specifically the United Kingdom?
It is very difficult to say ‘specifically the United Kingdom.’ We can talk about Estonia, for example, or Poland, which is now intensively buying tanks. They are all NATO members. And it's not that simple. Unfortunately, there is a huge gap between the statements of political leaders and the consequences of any practical actions in the defence system. Because, again, their national defence is based on collective security capabilities and participation in that collective security.
To be honest, it scares me that they seem to understand the inevitability of such a scenario, but on the other hand, there is still a certain infantilism, as if it could be avoided. I don't understand what else needs to happen for proper preparation to begin.
We have to be honest. If we already have experience and such powerful technologies, we should not just be proud of it. It is simply an additional burden for us to, first, convince them that this is necessary. This will probably be the most difficult task. And second, to help them master all this.

Building effective platforms where they can gain some interest is a huge complex approach. It's not just about investing in what we would get today, but what they would get in five years. To do this, we need to involve their training system so that they can prepare. So that they can see how this weapon changes the landscape of combat operations and tactics. This is a huge amount of work that needs to be done today in order to see results in five years. But again, I repeat: it has already been 1.5 years since ‘today’ arrived, and there are still no results.
Let's talk about the Coalition of the Willing. On 2 March, Keir Starmer announced its creation. Subsequently, more than 30 countries joined it. What is its current status, what stage is it at, how is it being finalised, and when can we expect the first results?
My opinion: the initiative is wonderful and shows that Western politicians have the courage to at least declare it. Of course, for us, this is a huge hope that we can get at least the most important thing today — the funds to produce what we need.
But if you look closely at the whole process, it's not that simple. After all, we still feel the lack of those very drones and electronic warfare systems. There is still a huge area where work needs to be done....
Again, if we come to Western society, we will understand: this is not a khanate, where one person decides what to do, even if he just makes statements. These are democratic countries, and in order to launch a democratic process, they need to do a lot of work within their own governments. There are governments that have coalition capabilities, and there are those with which their leaders cannot actually talk — there is no coalition, and this must also be taken into account.

I recently published a long article which, among other things, states that the simplest thing to do in such a situation is to demonstrate interest in the relevant business. Business is not dependent on coalition fluctuations. But, of course, the opportunity offered to us by the leaders of the United Kingdom and France needs to be expanded.
Yes, we will see that they will not be able to do everything themselves. Most likely, they will have to return overseas and at least ask for political will to take certain steps. That is my opinion.
Everything is changing very quickly overseas. We are now seeing Trump's support, his intention to provide 100 billion in weapons, which our European partners will pay for. And if a peace agreement is not concluded within 50 days (and it will not be concluded), Trump promises sanctions against Russia. But he is a man of moods — and tomorrow everything can change dramatically. We cannot count on this all the time.
Absolutely. Especially since we need it now. More precisely, yesterday. And tomorrow will be the next day.
One of the controversial issues for the Coalition of the Willing is the possibility of deploying, in one form or another (it is clear that the military sees it one way and politicians another), a so-called peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. It seems that it is precisely this controversial and sensitive issue that is slowing down the work of the coalition. Is that true?
(Smiles. — S.K.)
It would be better if you didn't ask me that question, especially when it comes to all these contingents.

I kind of get the answer, that's why I asked.
Let me repeat: there won't be a war on 24 February 22. What kind of troops are we talking about? The ones that can shoot down 500 drones over Kyiv, or the ones that will roll in here in nice red trousers? So what's the point? Probably none.
You need to have the capacity to ensure peace in a country. And we started the conversation by saying that our capacity is very, very limited. Therefore, I would be quite sceptical about this issue from a practical point of view. From a political point of view, it is very good when a country at least declares its support and shows its willingness to even send soldiers if necessary. But this is only political support, which can be measured by completely different standards than shooting down drones, for example, over Kyiv.
It is no coincidence that I mentioned Trump's statement that our partners in the Old World will pay for American weapons. According to Reuters, the United Kingdom is ready to join in. Do we understand what weapons we are talking about? If, of course, we can talk about it?
The financial capabilities of the United Kingdom are quite different from those of the United States of America. We must not forget that although the United Kingdom is almost three times smaller than Ukraine, it has twice the population. And it has its own problems, which it is struggling with quite significantly. And at this moment, they are still trying to help Ukraine, for which we are extremely grateful. To be honest, I would doubt that Britain could solve the problems on its own with the amounts mentioned by the President of the United States. Perhaps some kind of coalition of states would be needed for this.
That is obvious.
But again, as I said, it is one thing when the government is consolidated, as in the United Kingdom. But this is not the case everywhere in Europe.

France and the United Kingdom recently signed a ministerial agreement on mutual support in the event of an armed attack. Both are NATO countries. Is NATO no longer seen as a sufficient guarantee? Are early agreements needed?
This is not really my field, but I will share my own view. Today, NATO remains the only point of reference for Ukraine. It is, first and foremost, the most powerful military bloc. Another question is that the fate of this most powerful military bloc will most likely be the same as that of the League of Nations.
When? The League of Nations ceased to exist after World War II. Although it was supposed to prevent it.
It will depend on many factors, including our enemies, who are not giving up and are working to divide Europe. That will be the first step.
God forbid that something like this should happen, but it seems to me that if today a country (a NATO member — S.K.) were to suffer significantly from aggression by a country such as the one we are currently at war with, it would probably be the end of that alliance. Unfortunately, it cannot withstand any criticism for objective and subjective reasons.
And the fifth article would hardly work, am I right?
In military matters, it is futile to predict anything. Anyone who predicts is a charlatan, because it depends on a million facts that cannot be predicted.

But this alliance needs to be rethought, restructured and, most likely, if it is to be preserved, all political ambitions must be discarded. First of all, we need to think about security, and therefore about Ukraine, and then, on that basis, form a huge security alliance, which will be formed anyway. Because the other side will form it quite quickly along its lines.
In fact, it has already formed it.
Let's say, de facto. To form it de jure, all that is needed is to stop the war here, to clearly understand who owes what to whom and what to do next.
If we imagine that some kind of hybrid attack on countries will still take place, we can always say that it does not meet NATO's clearly defined standards. Hypothetically: tanks did not roll in here, but rather a man-made disaster, a terrorist attack and a blackout ‘happened’ at the same time.
I don't want to dwell on this, maybe separately. I would talk about the eternity of NATO, what it is based on, and you yourself would give an assessment of its capabilities based on each indicator.
All right, we will still have interviews with military, diplomatic and, I think, political figures as well. But now — about the war. In 2023, Valeriy Zaluzhnyy stated that we had effectively reached a dead end, with the situation resembling World War I, when neither side could achieve a technological breakthrough. I will quote: ‘The greatest risk of a gruelling trench war is that it could drag on for years and define the Ukrainian state.’ Almost two years have passed since then. What are the possibilities for getting out of this situation now?

Let's not dwell on why this impasse arose. I've already lost my voice on this. Let's just state the fact that it exists. Of course, it is possible to get out of it. Here are two examples of how the Russians found a way out.
Let's look at the ground, at this buffer zone that we created between our positions and the Russian ones. And in fact, they held this line of contact thanks to the saturation of drones and the fact that the line of contact became completely transparent. I believe that while we were looking for more drones to make our defence more stable, the Russians took a different path.
With manpower?
No. Manpower was a cover to create constant tension. Because in this situation, the worst thing is a freeze and a standstill, because then it will be very difficult to lead the soldiers to slaughter again, I am talking about the Russians.
They looked at how to expand this zone and came up with FPV drones on fibre optics. And then this zone, which was 10–15 km two months ago, became 50 km for us. They knock out our logistics, completely cut off the supply routes for ammunition, food, evacuation of the wounded, etc. After that, the positions are exhausted. They come in — and no one, let's say, resists anymore. They tested this ‘wonderful’ tactic in the Kursk direction and are now successfully applying it in many others.
That's on the ground. Now let's look at the sky. When we found a relatively cheap solution for drones — mobile fire groups — and were proud that we were doing a good job...

Now they are no longer relevant.
Yes. The Russians have moved on. We stopped at mobile fire groups, while the Russians raised their ‘shaheds’ to an altitude of about 2,000 metres and above — they calmly fly across the entire territory of Ukraine to Kyiv and are already beginning, so to speak, to bomb the city with ‘debris’. Here is a way out of this impasse — a technological one.
You have to think not about what you need today. You have to think about what you will need in a year, two, three.
Are we thinking about this?
Are we? (Smiles. — S.K.) Well, I think so. I see something. All this will end in three years, five at most.
The war?
Not the war, Sonya. This phenomenon is called finding parity. To make it easier to understand: the attacking forces and the defending forces are constantly competing with each other. When they started developing FPV, something was found to fight them. This scientific and technological progress, this competition will end in five years, so be it. Let's give someone a chance. Maybe it will help someone. Although I think it will be three. And now we have to see what will happen in three years. In three years, there will be accumulation.
Let me put it more simply. The British invented the tank in 1915. And Mr. Guderian began his first blitzkriegs in 1940. It took him 25 years. In the current situation (I'm not talking about drones, I'm calling it technology) — three. Well, five years at most.
But will the war continue all this time?
It depends on what kind of war we are talking about. If we are talking about a war similar to World War II in terms of its principles and methods, which began on 24 February 22, it ended somewhere in December 23. That is why they cannot stop it now. It ended. That war, when columns of tanks were rolling, when soldiers were needed. In 2024, a completely different war began, called a war of attrition.

In 1922, tanks rolled in, followed by others, whom I will not name, who undermined our defence capabilities. Now they have switched places. Now the front line is mainly intended for killing. Killing is a must there. Everything else happens here. Do you understand? That's the kind of war I'm talking about. Will it continue or not? If we try to achieve only a ceasefire without forming our future defence, then it will continue for a long time. And if it started in 2014, God willing, it will end in 2034.
Will we have enough people? The issue of mobilisation has not been resolved.
The thing is, Sonya, that while we are thinking about the people we will not have enough of in the future... There are two main factors in the future war — not today's, but the one that will happen someday. Demographic: there really are not enough people. Neither in Russia nor in Ukraine. The number of casualties among the population of both Ukraine and Russia, both killed and wounded, has reached a critical level.
In Russia too?
Russia now faces a choice (I am absolutely sure of this) — either to recruit ‘meat’ again in 2026, but this time in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other ‘classy’ cities, or to come up with something else. Most likely, this option is unacceptable. Why? Because someone in Ukraine might come up with a billion drones that cost £5 each, and they won't care how many people Putin sends. It doesn't matter. Before World War I, how many kids did families have? Ten to fifteen. Before World War II, eight to ten. That's why the losses were so huge. And when some ‘commanders’ said that ‘women will give birth,’ they were right. That was the concept. Many people are now waiting for people and saying, ‘We don't have enough people.’ I think that's a bit of a mistake.
So, the first factor is demographic; it will require a minimum of people and maximum results.

The second factor is economic. For example, the British army used a million shells a month during World War I. Now the British army has no idea what a million shells looks like. Why? Because now shells are being bought for Ukraine, and I think you know at what price. I will not say how many shells we used in 2024 and what benefits they brought. An average of 500 drones flew into Ukraine yesterday. According to NATO standards, at least three missiles are needed for each target — 1,500. A drone costs around $50,000. And a missile for IRIS-T — about 800,000.
A missile for Patriot?
For Patriot? I think it's no secret that they produce 200 of them a year. And here we have 500 targets a day. Please tell me, what country can fight like this?
So, the future of war is ultra-cheap weapons with ultra-high efficiency. Don't you think that's what we're seeing now? And now we need to think not about the fact that we don't have enough mobilised people, we need brains and a strategy for rebuilding everything. Do you understand?

It is very surprising, in my personal opinion, that in Ukraine, when this new weapon appeared (and it was new weapons that once shaped empires: the Roman Empire, the Mongol-Tatar yoke, the French Empire, and even the Hungarian Empire were shaped by the emergence of new weapons and the rapid mastery of tactics for their use. Here it is), Ukraine was unable to quickly master new technologies for objective/subjective reasons. I am talking about technology, not just unmanned systems.