Situation at frontline. Spark of hope

Khortytsya operational-strategic group

On 26 January, Army Commander General Mykhaylo Drapatyy was appointed commander of the Khortytsya operational and strategic grouping, leading the fight from Kharkiv (the war in Kursk and northern Kharkiv Regions is not his area of responsibility) to the border of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhya Regions (Zaporizhzhya and Kherson Regions are not his area of responsibility either).

A change of leader always leads to a change in leadership style, and in war, it also changes the behaviour of the troops. Speaking for myself, there was a general who was the Chief of Staff of the ATO, and under him we mostly wrote explanations for why the troops of the Luhansk Operational and Tactical Group were shelling the poor unfortunate ‘separatists’. The Chief of Staff changed and the view of these events changed: our troops responded aggressively to provocations, as before, but the senior staff looked at it calmly and did not demand explanations. One day, the head of the Joint Centre for Coordination and Control called and asked why the artillery of the Luhansk Operational and Tactical Group was firing in the middle of the night, and demanded that the shelling stop. For 10 minutes, the Command Post of the Operational and Tactical Group dealt with the next shift - all the artillery was sleeping in the withdrawal areas and did not violate the ceasefire. About 15 minutes later, the head of the JCCC called again: "You can put things in order if you want!". For about 10 years, it has been unclear what it was. In the morning, the Chief of Staff of the Anti-Terrorist Operation assessed the incident as a separatist provocation to which the Luhansk Operational and Tactical Group did not respond. Our artillery drew conclusions and its regular forces, let's just say, began to remind us of themselves with accurate fire at the right moments, explaining to ceasefire violators that they should not shoot in our direction even with slingshots.

What has changed now?

On 9 February, in the Pokrovsk direction, units of the Khortytsya Operational and Strategic Group of Troops drove the enemy's 35th Brigade from the northern outskirts of Dachenske in a sudden counterattack, about 800 metres along the front and up to 1 km in depth. 

On 10 February, from its positions in Zvirove, other Khortytsya units attacked in the direction of Pishchane and, on a front of up to 1 km, penetrated the enemy's 74th Brigade by 1.5 km, advancing near mine No. 3. The attack near Uspenivka was also successful. On that day, Khortytsya units attacked near Kotlyne, in the direction of Nadiyivka and Sribne.

Of course, this all looks like the success of a few company-level units. But the trend is important here. The enemy is trying to bypass Pokrovsk as deeply as possible from the west, and now this pincer has reached the Kotlyne-Udachne line and is 7 km along the front and 12-13 km deep. If Khortytsya's units make their way from Pishchane and Uspenivka to Solone, the enemy's advanced units of the 15th and 74th brigades will be surrounded. This development raises the question for the command of the enemy's Centre military unit: should it move further west or pay attention to its increasingly vulnerable flanks? Against the backdrop of a slowdown in hostilities in the Pokrovsk sector, Khortytsya's active actions are a good sign.

On 10 February, units of the Khortytsya unit counterattacked northwest of Ivanivka in the Lyman sector against the enemy's 144th Division, which is trying to gain a foothold on the western bank of the Siverskyy Donets. The counterattack was repeated on 12 February. These attacks complicate the enemy's advance towards the Lyman and thus slow down the enemy's movement towards the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the north, making it impossible to fully occupy Donetsk Region.

On 12 February, units of the Khortytsya unit attacked near Toretsk, advancing on the northern outskirts of Toretsk, north-east of Druzhba village and in the centre of Leonidivka.

These actions slow down the formation of the enemy's southern flank for a further attack on Kostyantynivka. The longer the enemy does not reach the Yablunivka - Oleksandro-Kalynove line in the Toretsk sector, the longer it will not be able to launch an assault on the belt of fortresses from its southern flank. This is also facilitated by the strong defence near Chasiv Yar and other settlements in the Kramatorsk direction.

On the same day, Khortytsya units liberated Pishchane and attacked near Zvirove and Dachenske.

On 13 February, Khortytsya units cleared the industrial area in Vodyane Druhe and drove Russian troops out of Dachenske, advanced on the southwestern outskirts of Pishchane, and counterattacked on the western outskirts of Lysivka, near Pokrovsk, Kotlyne, and Preobrazhenka. In the area of the farm in the village of Vodiane Druve, Khortytsya's units counterattacked and pushed the enemy south towards Baranivka, which had been captured earlier.

Of course, all of these actions were facilitated by the consolidation of our troops through their gradual withdrawal, the restoration of the combat capability of individual units, the arrival of reserves, and the exhaustion of the enemy, but the simultaneous change in Khortytsya's behaviour in several directions over the course of four days says a lot about changes in the command and control of the troops.

North of Kharkiv Region, Kharkiv operational and tactical grouping

During the week, we saw attacks by our troops both near Lypky and in Vovchansk. In both directions, Kharkiv made small advances. The enemy's Sever military unit is in a tactical deadlock, and its commander, General Lapin, is getting hit twice as hard because he suddenly became responsible for the liberation of the Kursk region, where the headquarters of the counter-terrorist operation has somehow quietly gone into the woods.

Kursk Region

The units of the Siversk Operational and Tactical Group found the junction of the flanks of the 177th Marine Regiment and the 11th Separate Mechanised Brigade, and suddenly attacked. As a result, our men captured Makhnivka, advanced through Cherkaska Konopelka, reached Fanasiyivka, for which they began fighting, and reached Ulanok. To make sure that the 11th Brigade's service was not considered honey, Siversk attacked in the direction of Ruska Konopelka. The 11th Brigade, whose headquarters concealed the real level of casualties and provided false combat reports throughout January, now has to explain why the brigade cannot hold the 5km line between the two Konopelkas, as if that were a task for a battalion! There is information that the brigade commander was handcuffed and sent to the rear to write an explanation.

Thanks to Siversk's actions, a group of highly mobile enemy troops (most of the Airborne Forces and Marines) is stuck in the Kursk Region, the Lgov-Belgorod railway remains cut off (cargo is being transported bypassing it through Kursk), and the Kursk-Sudzha-Sumy road and the Sudzha gas metering station on the main gas pipeline to Europe are under our control. All of this happened after Siversk destroyed the enemy with all available means in January and attacked the most vulnerable areas in February. This is what ‘active defence’ looks like. The enemy has a similarly dystrophic defence area near Mala Loknya in the direction of Kruhlenke. We are observing it.

Let's also remember that the presence of Siversk spoils the Kremlin's picture for 9 May, the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. It will be very embarrassing for Comrade Kim to sell the ‘Great Victory’ when you don't control your own territory.

That's the kind of candy we have today. Although it is a little lemony, sour. So far, there is a problem with chocolate ones.