For almost three years of full-scale war, Russia has lost sight of its strategic goals and is surviving on tactical gains, though it occasionally comes close to creating operational crises. However, the Russians are paying a huge price for this: their army is unable to build up reserves, and their command and staff have failed to break the deadlock in their strategic offensive. In other words, the Russian forces have concentrated all their resources on achieving immediate results that provide neither a decisive advantage nor a decisive victory.
Kursk direction
On 5 January, the Siversk group unexpectedly struck towards Velyke Soldatske, where the Russian military was preparing to attack Sudzha along the R200 highway. As a result, the Russian military command was forced to launch attacks along the entire contact line a day earlier than planned. This premature assault caused the offensive from Velyke Soldatske to fail, as Russian forces lost the positions from which they were supposed to attack.
In January, the enemy managed to push Siversk on the western flank to the Mala Lokhnya River but advanced no further. Near Daryino and Novyy Klyn, their attempts also failed. On the eastern flank, the enemy advanced in the area of Makhnivka and Ruske Porichchya but lost ground in mid-January. Currently, Makhnivka is under Ukrainian control, while Ruske Porichchya remains a grey zone. The Siversk military unit is defending along water obstacles, forcing the Russians into difficult river crossings.
Near Daryino, Kurylivka, and Ruske Porichchya, the enemy is now storming a defensive line they built themselves but abandoned in August 2024. This area plays a key role in tying down most of the aggressor’s highly mobile forces. In January, regiments from three Airborne Forces divisions, two brigades, and a marine regiment from the Black Sea, Pacific Fleets, and Caspian Flotilla were engaged here. This grouping suffered significant losses, which began to affect its combat capability by late January. By early February, the large-scale offensive had been reduced to localised attacks.
For example, the village of Kurylivka is being stormed by the 177th Marine Regiment of the Caspian Flotilla, redeployed from the Zaporizhzhya direction. They are forced to attack across the Psel River. Most Russian forces cannot cross the river, and those who do fail to reach Ukrainian positions.
This regiment, once considered one of the most capable in the Kursk Region, falsely reported capturing Kurylivka - and their command believed it. However, the village remains under Ukrainian control. Over the following week, the regiment launched repeated assaults with minimal support and limited ammunition. The result: overcrowded medical centres, wounded soldiers left on the battlefield without evacuation or care, heavy casualties, and about 15 captured. The regiment has lost almost a quarter of its personnel and is close to losing combat effectiveness entirely.
Even if a miracle happens and Kurylivka falls, it will not lead to a breakthrough in Ukrainian defences, as Russia lacks reserves to exploit any success. Another notable factor is the Korean contingent: out of 3,500 troops involved in the fighting, 65% have been killed or wounded. On 10 January, they were withdrawn from the war zone. There have also been cases of Korean soldiers deserting and even using weapons against Russian forces. Based on the current situation, the enemy is expected to regroup by 7–15 February before continuing its offensive.
Kupyansk direction
The aggressor has significantly expanded its bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil River, capturing the villages of Zakhidne and Dvorichne and reoccupying Novomlynsk. In December, the bridgehead was held by two motorised rifle regiments, but now it hosts up to half of the 6th Combined Arms Army and the entire 69th Division. Ukrainian forces under the Khortytsia military unit were defending this sector with two understrength armoured brigades. This numerical disadvantage allowed the enemy to expand the bridgehead, deploy reinforcements, and launch an offensive both westward and southward towards Kupyansk.
The 6th Army HQ now has two strategic options:
- Cross the Oskil River, establish a bridgehead south of Kupyansk near Senkove, and launch a simultaneous north-south assault on the city - potentially encircling part of the Khortytsya unit still holding positions on the eastern bank.
- Advance from Dvorichna towards Velyky Burluk - a mission previously assigned to the Sever military unit in May 2024, which it failed to accomplish.
Current indicators suggest the enemy has chosen the first option. The 45th Engineering and Camouflage Brigade is being redeployed to Senkove, while Russian infantry attempts to push forward near Kolisnykivka. However, the Khortytsya unit has a well-prepared defensive line in Senkove and sufficient troops, meaning this will not be an easy fight for the enemy. Still, they will try.
If history is any guide, Russian forces attempted to cross the river near Lyman six times in 2022 and suffered heavy losses. If they persist here, they could lose an entire engineering brigade by the end of February. The situation remains serious for the Defence Forces, but it is possible that the Khortytsya unit is waiting for the enemy to concentrate its forces (i.e., the full strength of the 69th Division, possibly with reinforcements) before launching a counterattack. The recent appointment of General Drapaty to command Khortytsya suggests this may be the plan.
In the Borova sector, Ukrainian forces have conducted several successful counterattacks, improving their positions near Zahryzove.
The enemy is aggressively attacking from Lozova, attempting to break through Ukrainian defences near Kopanky and Novoyehorivka. True to Russian military tradition, the 20th Army command prematurely reported the “capture” of Novoyehorivka. The theatre command, believing this false report, ordered the 20th Army to advance east and southeast of Kopanky. However, in reality, the Russian army has been stuck in Kopanky since December, failing to advance from Pershotravneve.
Now, Russian forces are testing the terrain southeast of Novoyehorivka - an area they do not fully control. Given the recent removal of several Russian commanders for falsely claiming the capture of Bilohorivka and other villages, the 20th Army commander is now desperate to seize Novoyehorivka at any cost, throwing wave after wave of troops into battle. The result: heavy losses, with soldiers’ corpses piling up in the village’s farmland. The enemy will likely push towards Borova and attempt to capture it by the end of March. However, given their current attrition rate and logistical challenges, sustaining a large-scale offensive remains questionable.
Kramatorsk and Toretsk directions
It is advisable to consider these two directions together, as the enemy’s ultimate goal is to occupy the entire Donetsk Region. Securing this area would open the road to Kostyantynivka and Kramatorsk. The loss of positions at the refractory plant in Chasiv Yar marks the end of the line: the Defence Forces will withdraw from the city, but the timing remains uncertain.
The battle for Chasiv Yar is entering its final stages. Russian forces are advancing slowly in the south and southwest but have suffered heavy losses in the fight for the plant. If our troops manage to hold the city until the end of February before withdrawing, it will be a significant tactical achievement. However, they must not leave earlier.
In the Kramatorsk sector, the enemy’s forces consist of the 98th Airborne Division (excluding the 217th Regiment, which remains in Kursk Oblast), the 200th Brigade from Murmansk Oblast, and several volunteer reconnaissance and assault brigades. Among them, the most well-known is the 88th Espanyol, recruited from CSKA football fans. However, these forces are insufficient not only for rapid advancement but also for sustaining momentum after Khortytsya’s withdrawal from Chasiv Yar.
The situation could change dramatically if the enemy command prioritises the Kramatorsk direction in the theatre of operations. In this case, even offensive actions in the Pokrovske sector might be paused, as the objectives here are far more ambitious: breaking through to Kostyantynivka, then advancing to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk - the key defensive strongholds in eastern Ukraine - before launching a full-scale assault.
The withdrawal of Khortytsya unit from Klishchiyivka and Andriyivka to the western bank of the Siverskyy Donets-Donbas Canal, along with the near-total occupation of Toretsk, allows the Russian command to seriously consider advancing on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk from two directions simultaneously - via Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
Additionally, the Russian Centre military group has made gains east of Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk, creating a third potential axis of attack. By expanding their foothold near Vozdvyzhenka, Russian forces could attempt to cut through Ukrainian defences near Oleksandropol and advance on Kramatorsk via Kostyantynivka from the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad direction. However, the reality on the frontline presents significant obstacles to these plans.
At present, Russian forces in the Toretsk and Kramatorsk directions lack the manpower for such an operation. They also have insufficient reserves, meaning reinforcements would need to be redeployed from other sector - where resources are already stretched thin. General Mordvychov, commander of the Centre division, is currently preparing the Centre and Vostok units for an assault on Pokrovsk. However, if this offensive fails within the first two weeks, the Pokrovsk direction will become secondary, and the main effort will shift to Kramatorsk, with attacks from three directions. By mid-to-late February, the situation should become clearer. For now, Tolstoy’s forces are focused on expanding their positions near Vozdvyzhenka, with expected attacks on Oleksandropol from the south, west, and east.
Pokrovsk direction
Russian forces of the Centre division are now on the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, attempting to bypass the urban area from both the east (via Vozdvyzhenka) and the west (via Kotlyne). Progress is more significant in the west, while in the east, the advance is slow but persistent. Russian propaganda, supported by certain Ukrainian pessimists, portrays the Pokrovsk operation as a potential encirclement of Ukrainian forces. In reality, the enemy’s goal is more straightforward: to establish control over a broader area west and east of Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, securing a foothold for a direct assault. Given time constraints and limited resources, Russian forces are unlikely to execute a complex manoeuvre; instead, they will rely on frontal assaults.
The Defence Forces have established a solid defensive line, well-manned and robust. Observers report that it is holding effectively, leaving no openings for the Russian tactic of infiltrating with small assault groups. As a result, intense and prolonged battles are expected for each position. The enemy is already attempting to weaken Ukrainian defences through heavy aerial bombardments and large-scale drone attacks. For the upcoming assault, they are concentrating forces from three armies: the 41st, 2nd, and 51st, previously engaged in the Pokrovske, Novopavlivka, and Hulyaypole sectors. However, as fighting continues in those areas, assembling a strike force for Pokrovsk will take time. If enemy command shifts priorities, the front could stagnate for months.
Novopavlivka direction
In the area between the Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly rivers, the Khortytsya military unit remains on the defensive, holding Dachne on its eastern flank. Russian forces have crossed the Sukhi Yaly but are unable to advance quickly on the northern bank. Meanwhile, from the north, an enemy push from Vovcha towards Andriyivka threatens to open the way for an offensive on Kostyantynopil, potentially cutting off Ukrainian forces between Ulakly and Dachne.
Russian forces here have suffered heavy losses, with units frequently rotated to Pokrovsk. Those remaining are combat-weary and depleted after continuous fighting for over a month. Given the current dynamics, Ukrainian positions between Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly will likely be eliminated between mid-February and mid-March. However, further Russian advances westward are unlikely, as reinforcements will be redirected to Pokrovsk or even Kramatorsk. By the end of March, Russian forces may reach Mokry Yaly, followed by an operational pause until summer.
Hulyaypole direction
The enemy has captured Velyka Novosilka but has since slowed its advance west and northwest of the village. Initially hailed as a major victory by Russian propaganda, the settlement’s strategic importance has been overstated.
Previously, Velyka Novosilka served as a supply hub for Ukrainian forces defending Vuhledar. With the loss of Vuhledar, it remains the last major Ukrainian stronghold in southern Donetsk Region. However, the Defence Forces are already repositioning 9–15 km to the north-northwest, establishing a new defensive line along Komyshuvakha-Shevchenko (lower) - Dniproenergia.
The enemy will not be able to pursue Ukrainian units, there are not enough ATVs for everyone, the surviving personnel are exhausted, and the rotation to the Pokrovske direction has not been cancelled. The conclusion from the situation assessment is that there will be no breakthroughs into Zaporizhzhya or Dnipropetrovsk Regions because there is nothing to do so with. The health of the enemy groups also does not allow them to roll back the Tavria front and reach Zaporizhzhya.
Anyone who follows the fighting should be able to see that troops from as many as three groups are operating in the area: Centre, East and South. The units are heavily mixed, their command and control and interaction were not the best before, and now they have only deteriorated.
Therefore, we can conclude that the capture of Velyka Novosilka is not part of any wise plan or subtle strategic intent: the capture of this village means just the capture of another village.
Could the situation here worsen for Ukrainian forces? Yes, but only if the enemy significantly improves its command structure, restores combat effectiveness, and doubles its troop numbers—none of which is currently feasible. Without mobilisation, Russia lacks the manpower for further major offensives.
So, in February, we should expect the enemy to resume its offensive in Kursk Region, expand the bridgehead near Dvorichna and fierce fighting at Borova in Kharkiv Region, withdrawal of the Defence Forces from Chasiv Yar and the start of fighting on the outskirts of Kramatorsk, the completion of the attack group near Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad and the assault on this agglomeration, the elimination of the Defence Forces bridgehead between Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly, the stabilisation of the front line in the Novopavlivka sector and positional fighting at the Komyshuvakha-Shevchenko - Dniproenergia.
This is far from the worst scenario for the Defence Forces, especially given the Commander-in-Chief's promises to resume the practice of rotations and the accumulation of Defence Forces reserves.