Are we on the verge of ending the war?
Not yet. As Donald Trump rightly pointed out, it takes two to tango. Ukraine’s consent alone is not enough for a ceasefire – a similar decision from Russia is needed.
So far, the only tangible outcome of the Jeddah meeting has been Washington’s decision to resume assistance to Ukraine and provide intelligence to the Defence Forces.
This is a significant achievement. Just hours after the final handshakes in Saudi Arabia, aid began to arrive – apparently, supplies that the US had previously delivered to Poland but withheld from Ukraine following Donald Trump’s decision.
Thus, the United States has once again distanced itself from a stance of being “above the conflict” or “a neutral party seeking to talk to both sides.” The decision to continue arming Ukraine restores, at least for now, the partnership between Washington and Kyiv. It also potentially renders the White House’s numerous overtures to the Kremlin ineffective.
Can Vladimir Putin agree to the US proposal? Perhaps we will soon hear Moscow’s response to the thirty-day ceasefire proposal.
It is possible that, while negotiating the ceasefire with Ukraine, Donald Trump already had some assurances from Vladimir Putin that such a proposal would be accepted.
If that is the case, the question arises: what was included in the package along with the truce offer? For instance, the United States declared that Ukraine’s NATO membership was inappropriate even before holding public consultations with Moscow. Weakening its own negotiating position ahead of talks seemed unusual – why give up leverage in advance rather than use it as a bargaining chip? But perhaps this was not a premature concession, but rather a result of negotiations with Russia.
And could the White House administration’s strong desire to demonstrate a quick positive result have influenced the likely negotiations between the US and Russia?
Let’s also not forget that Moscow has repeatedly emphasised that it will not agree to a temporary truce but instead demands a “systemic solution.” It also insists on “taking into account new realities” – in particular, Russian recognition of the occupied regions of Ukraine, which it “incorporated into the Russian Federation” by making a corresponding entry in its own constitution.
On the other hand, given Donald Trump’s style (to put it mildly, creative chaos), it is entirely possible that Washington made the ceasefire proposal without prior consultation with Moscow. “His [Trump’s] foreign policy is like jazz: it’s free-form, without structure, and constantly improvising. This could save the lives – or cause the deaths – of many more Ukrainians and Russians,” wrote The Washington Post columnist David Ignatius last week. And, yes, we have seen this “jazz” too often in recent weeks – both in relation to Ukraine and the rest of the world.
If there is no agreement with Russia (which is quite likely), what will the US president do if his Russian counterpart rejects the truce proposal? Will we see the announced “large-scale sanctions”? Or, on the contrary, will he take additional steps towards Moscow in an attempt to bring Putin to the negotiating table?
It must be understood that Moscow’s decision will depend not only – or even primarily – on Washington’s proposals and threats but on the Kremlin’s overall assessment of the situation and its own prospects:
- Whether the Russian armed forces are capable of achieving tangible results on the battlefield in the coming months.
- Whether Russia’s economy can sustain its war efforts at the current level of mobilisation for an extended period – at least six months to a year.
- Whether Ukraine’s resilience will hold, or if its frontlines (or rear) will collapse if the prospect of a prolonged war becomes more certain.
- The position of China, which is, in fact, the only state currently capable of exerting effective pressure on Russia.
The Kremlin’s temptation to increase pressure on Ukraine is obvious – especially when the United States is not only unwilling to stand with us “as long as necessary” but also readily abandons its role as a partner. Meanwhile, despite the passionate statements of its leaders, the EU remains unable to compensate for the absence of US support. The White House’s actions have nearly nullified efforts to isolate Russia internationally and have, at the highest level, cast doubt on its responsibility for the aggression.
At the same time, Russia’s exhaustion and inability to sustain its previous offensive pace are just as evident. Moscow, perhaps no less than Ukraine, needs a pause to regroup, recover, and acquire additional capabilities for continued warfare. This is especially true if, as part of a war-ending agreement, Russia manages to negotiate the softening – or even the lifting – of some sanctions.
On his way to Saudi Arabia, Secretary Rubio stated that both sides should be prepared to make concessions for peace. While this may sound like an obvious platitude, it’s important to remember that Ukraine has been actively pressured into making concessions over the past month – through the suspension of aid, the blocking of intelligence access, aggressive statements by top US officials, and political manoeuvring at the White House.
At the same time, have there been any serious attempts to demonstrate strength towards Russia? Perhaps a few rather mild statements about tougher sanctions – immediately followed by reassurances about Donald Trump’s excellent relationship with Vladimir Putin.
But, again, is the US prepared to raise the stakes and risk worsening relations with Russia?
And one more thing. If the meeting in Jeddah was only about the first step – a ceasefire (along with the exchange of prisoners of war, the release of civilian prisoners, and the return of abducted Ukrainian children, i.e. issues on which the US and Ukraine largely agree) – why did the delegations need more than eight hours of talks?
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyy commented on the talks, including their length: “I can only say one thing about the impression of such a long duration: historians underestimate the role of human exhaustion in making historical decisions. It is in these last hours of the endgame, when fatigue is already showing, that it suddenly becomes possible to break the deadlock and even make difficult compromises”. So, were there any difficult compromises? Ukrainian society has the right to know.
This is an important point – perhaps the most important. Until now, in consultation with the US and other partners, Ukraine has insisted that the first step towards peace should be security guarantees that would prevent the resumption of war or new Russian aggression in the near future. Instead, the White House under Donald Trump has taken the opposite approach: first, let’s agree to stop the fighting, and then we’ll discuss everything else. As a result, Ukraine was forced to accept the American approach. Discussion of security guarantees was postponed. And not only by the United States – our European partners must also coordinate any strategic decisions within NATO, primarily with Washington.
Therefore, securing anything more than vague “security assurances” in the future remains doubtful. And we have seen the consequences of truces with Russia without effective security guarantees too many times since 2014.
* * *
In recent weeks, during consultations with partners, Ukraine’s representatives have repeatedly heard the phrase: “If you are not at the table, you are on the menu.” The message is clear: negotiations are necessary – first with the United States, and only then with Russia.
Yesterday, Ukraine took its seat at the table. It is not that we have refused to do so until now – far from it. However, until recently, there were hopes that, with the support of our allies, we could enter negotiations from a position of strength – with cards in hand, as Donald Trump put it. Now, it seems, we are sitting down without them.
Therefore, we will have to make extra efforts to avoid ending up on someone’s menu.
