In his speech, he voiced several important points:- The US strategic interest is to reset relations with Russia;- the US is not interested in ending the war, which would give Ukraine any benefits;- stopping aid to Ukraine is a compulsion to negotiate, an incentive to give up the desire to win;- it is impossible to defeat Russia in a war of attrition, because it does not care how many citizens die, and Ukraine must realise this.
This is the vision of the US representative, one of the guarantors under the Budapest Memorandum. At the press conference, Kellogg continued to use the theses from US Vice President Vance's speeches about the US economic interest that would protect Ukraine if it signed the rare minerals agreement.
Mr Kellogg, as a person who works in the US national security sphere and receives a salary on a card from the State Department, should have read the Budapest Memorandum, which states in paragraph 3: ‘The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm to Ukraine their commitments under the principles of the CSCE Final Act to refrain from economic pressure aimed at subordinating to their interests the exercise by Ukraine of rights inherent in its sovereignty and thereby obtaining any benefits.’
Five weeks after Donald Trump's inauguration, the United States has turned from a partner to a highwayman - and nothing good can be expected from overseas for Ukraine, especially our defence forces, in the short term.
What could we have been cut off from?
The US Armed Forces satellite constellation consists of 171 satellites, of which:
14 - early warning (four DSP satellites, six SBIRS Geo satellites, four Tracking Layer Tranche satellites);
11 - surveillance (six GSSAP, one ORS-5, one SBSS (Space Based Surveillance System), three Silent Barker (NRO L-107);
32 - electronic reconnaissance (seven Mentor (advanced Orion), two Mercury, two Nemesis, one Sharp (NRO L-67), three Trumpet, four Improved Trumpet, 12 Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS), one NRO L-85);
14 - reconnaissance (five FIA Radar, five Evolved Enhanced/Improved Crystal, two NRO L-71, two NRO L-76).
The rest are for communications, meteorology, geopositioning and navigation. We were definitely disconnected from Maxar satellite data. A layer of satellite information has disappeared in the Delta air traffic control system, which is the saddest thing.
How did it work?
American intelligence officers periodically provided their Ukrainian colleagues with satellite images and other intelligence information obtained from space. The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has a department that knows how to work with such photos. Then everything was sent to the General Staff and J2 (intelligence) of the strategic headquarters in a processed form.
What exactly did the Defence Forces lose?
Information for targeting HIMARS and M270. In order to launch ATACMS or any other missile at 300 km, it is necessary to prepare data for a missile strike. In general, this is a 9th grade geometry problem with sines and cosines. No one has to do it manually, everything is prepared by the on-board computer of the MLRS. We need the rectangular coordinates of the launch point and the target. And that's it.
Whether this data is received from a satellite or from a Special Forces soldier hiding near the target in the deep rear, or whether a UAV has flown there or some other way (and there are many ways), it makes no difference. As long as there is something to shoot with, the Defence Forces will shoot. The Ukrainian Special Forces and the DIU do not need advertising and have shown their skills 100,500 times. The coordinates will be available.
Most targets for missile strikes are stationary and well known. Command posts, air defence facilities, helicopter landing sites, operational depots are capable of manoeuvring, while everything else (airfields, railway stations, arsenals, etc.) is immovable.
When it is decided what should be destroyed, the J3 (operational) chief calls the fire support officer and says: I need to stop unloading trains here, stop aircraft from flying from this airfield, this warehouse is redundant, and it is advisable to strike at command posts here, here, and if there are missiles left, at this one too. The fire support officer goes to his room, turns on Google Earth, finds stationary objects, looks at them carefully, sometimes even prints them on A4, and goes to the J2 and asks for the latest coordinates from the list dictated by the J3. No satellites are needed until then. Then Chief J2 calls his ‘cosmonaut’, who performs this task. Since the cessation of intelligence sharing, the ‘astronaut’ has been without American space materials. It's a pity, of course, but those were not the only materials in the world. Where to get alternative ones - we will look at this a little further below.
A much bigger problem is the possible loss of early warning of cruise missile take-offs and missile launches from land and sea platforms. Until the advent of anti-radar missiles, air defence radars operated around the clock, day and night, but after the advent of HARM, X-31, etc. missiles, radars are only switched on according to a schedule or upon a warning signal of an attack. And this is where the 14 US early warning satellites give the Ukrainian air defence system precious time to get ready and citizens the opportunity to run for shelter.
There is an intelligence community called 5 eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States). The UK will allegedly continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine, but only its own. It will not be able to pass on intelligence obtained as part of an exchange with the United States.
In addition to 5 eyes, there are 5+ eyes, 6 eyes, 9 eyes, 14 eyes, in short, ophthalmology is deeply rooted in intelligence.
Therefore, let's pay attention to the satellite groups of other states:
Algeria: three ALSAT reconnaissance satellites;
Egypt: three reconnaissance satellites (one Egyptsat-A; two Horus);
Israel: eight reconnaissance satellites (three Ofeq-5, two Ofeq-11, three TecSAR (Polaris);
Spain: Paz reconnaissance satellite;
Italy: seven reconnaissance satellites (four Cosmo (Skymed), two Cosmo SG, one OPTSAT-3000);
Morocco: two Mohammed VI reconnaissance satellites;
Singapore: DS-SAR reconnaissance satellite;
Thailand: two Napa reconnaissance satellites;
Turkey: two Gokturk reconnaissance satellites;
France: six reconnaissance satellites (one CSO-1, one CSO-2, one Helios 2A, one Helios 2B, two Pleiades) and three CERES electronic intelligence satellites;
Germany: six reconnaissance satellites (one SARah, five SAR-Lupe);
Japan: nine IGS reconnaissance satellites.
People in the know say that some countries provide the Ukrainian Defence Forces with satellite information. Where is the satellite group of the space power Ukraine and what is the State Space Agency of Ukraine doing?
By the way, Ukrainians are already used to having their electricity cut off for no reason at all. For the last three years, it has been missiles at transformers. But they also switch off for non-payment. After all, since 1992, there has not been a single year before a major war when Ukraine allocated 3% of GDP for defence, as provided for by law. Once it allocated 2.75%, and that was the maximum. Everything changed in 2019, but we are now paying for the previous years. Including for the lack of our own reconnaissance satellites.
Of course, we study the enemy. The Russian Federation has 13 reconnaissance satellites hovering in space and looking at Ukraine (four Bars-M, one EMKA, two Geo-IK-2, one Condor-FKA, one Neutron, two Persona, two Resurs-P), eight early warning satellites (six Lotus-S, one Peon-NKS, one Tselina-2), and six Tundra missile attack early warning satellites.
In general, space is an expensive toy, and military space is even more so, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to figure out which is a civilian satellite, which is a military satellite, and which is a dual-purpose satellite.
The Russians themselves say they have deployed several space systems:
- The Oko missile warning system (which monitored the continental US, expired in 2019)
- the unified space-based detection and combat control system Kupol (replacing Oko), and the same Tundra satellites;
- the 14k159 Liana maritime space reconnaissance and targeting system, which includes the Lotus-S and Pion-NKS satellites. The task is to search for aircraft carrier strike groups in the ocean;
- 14f137 Persona optoelectronic reconnaissance complex - designed to obtain high-resolution images and transmit them to Earth via radio. There are currently two of them in orbit, both of which expired in 2020-2022. But both are still on alert;
- radar reconnaissance spacecraft (there is no clarity about this group).
Russia's space grouping does not appear to be powerful or threatening, but it exists and should be taken into account.
Our partners have many times more space intelligence capabilities. Ukraine should focus on building warm relations and reliable channels for receiving intelligence.