The EU has several thousand fourth-generation fighter jets, enabling it to deploy top-tier aircraft such as the F-16 Block 50-70, Gripen, F-35, and Rafale — machines equipped with modern active-array radars, electronic warfare and radar analysis pylons, and long-range air-to-air missiles.
Air forces of the key states of the "coalition of the willing"
United Kingdom | Germany | France 91 Dassault Mirage 2000 |
Sweden | Turkey 234 F-16 (40 more are ordered) 19 F-4 Terminator 2020 | Finland |
Belgium | Netherlands | Denmark |
Potential members of the air coalition
Italy | Spain | Poland |
Norway | Romania | Czech Republic |
This would guarantee that any initial disarming strike is detected by UAVs and intelligence from countries like France and the UK, preventing Ukraine’s own aircraft from being neutralised. It would also ensure that Moscow cannot amass missiles again or refine its air defence and missile generation tactics.
Beyond gaining time for rearmament, the EU would benefit from valuable experience in intercepting barrages of X-101 missiles, especially the latest versions equipped with false-target firing devices. It would also gain experience in countering electronic warfare in a heavily disrupted environment, where adversaries actively target air defence aircraft.
This is crucial, as a sustainable ceasefire is unlikely in the coming months.
At the same time, the risk to pilots would be minimal. Ukraine’s modified MiG-29s continue to operate three years after Kyiv was expected to fall in three days, and its aviation was predicted to be destroyed on airfields by Iskander missile strikes.
These aircraft operate near the front, regularly striking targets such as a factory in Vovchansk, the bridge over the Conca, and camouflaged command posts.
Supported by two to three squadrons of electronic warfare aircraft, backed by radar aircraft and air command posts, and equipped with the best self-protection and counter-jamming pylons, Western forces would have a significant advantage over the Russian Air Force.
Additionally, they would rely on one of the strongest air defence networks in Europe. The Ukrainian Defence Forces likely have more than half of their air defence systems sourced from the West, supported by German, French, British, and Norwegian missile stockpiles, spare parts, instructors, and repair capabilities.
Importantly, Western aircraft would not need to approach targets closer than 200 km — at that distance, isolated missile launches pose little threat.
At first glance, the idea seems reasonable.
Even if airfields are located only in western Ukraine and in Poland and Romania (the eastern flank of the EU and NATO), aviation can still make a significant impact.
When missiles are launched or Shaheds take off, European aircraft will have enough time to reach the interception point, gain an advantageous altitude, and coordinate with electronic warfare and air defence systems in the sector.
If Moscow attempts another rapid advance towards Brovary, as in 2022, the enemy will be met with several hundred guided bombs and air-to-ground missiles — delivered alongside the Ukrainian Air Force — severely slowing its progress and inflicting heavy losses.
To conduct a deep air offensive against airfields in central and western Ukraine, Russia would need to suppress air defences. This would require overwhelming defence systems with hundreds of cruise missiles, deploying air defence helicopters, creating interference, striking with ballistic missiles equipped with concrete-piercing and cluster munitions, and launching anti-radar attacks.
A game of rock-paper-scissors: Russia would need to force Patriot and SAMP/T systems into reserve positions, disable control points and supply depots, blind radars, and take out air defence launchers.
Only then could they enter Ukrainian airspace, strike SAM systems with unguided bombs, execute ambush attacks, exhaust reserves, disrupt communication nodes, and suppress scattered air defence launchers using electronic warfare.
This is where the European “air police” would come into play. EU intelligence forces — supported by satellite networks, reconnaissance ships, and aircraft in the Baltic and Black Seas — would detect preparations for the first launch of hundreds of Kalibr and X-101 missiles, Iskander brigades, and their movements towards launch sites.
The first missile salvo would be met by a dispersed air force, intercepting hundreds of Kalibrs, preventing the overloading of defence channels, and ensuring that medium-range missile launchers protecting key areas remain operational—avoiding a catastrophe during the ballistic phase.
Russia would then face two hundred aircraft, supported by anti-aircraft drones, thousands of man-portable air defence systems, and IRIS-T and NASAMS systems lying in ambush. Aircraft would provide radar coverage, and radars in western Ukraine would remain operational, with damaged systems restored within the first 48 hours and repairs continuing at western facilities in the following weeks.
With the possibility that these few hundred aircraft could eventually become a few thousand. This could function as a true security complex — not just the announced hundred aircraft.
The issue of basing is, of course, crucial. The only real guarantees in this world come when soldiers physically risk their lives alongside their allies.
History has seen many so-called guarantees — such as support for the White Army during the Russian Civil War, or the USSR and Japan’s non-aggression pact. Not a memorandum, but a pact.
Right now, units from Luxembourg, Portugal, Belgium, Norway, the Czech Republic, and Germany are stationed in Lithuania. If aggression begins, it will not be possible to remain on the sidelines, merely expressing concern and holding consultations — coffins will be sent home to voters immediately.
This sounds like a real guarantee, unlike NATO’s Article 5, which only states that members “will immediately take, individually or jointly with other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary.”
What if they decide that holding consultations and sending observers is sufficient?
After all, this clause was created in the mid-20th century to allow the United States to determine what level of response would be appropriate.
That is why it is better for us to deploy our partners’ troops on Ukrainian territory — so that British bases are protected by British Sky Sabres, and French bases by the Italian-French SAMP/T. Similar to the designated areas of responsibility in Afghanistan.
And, of course, the respective armies and industries behind them. It must be understood that this is not just about two hundred Ukrainian and European pilots and aircraft.
This is the industry and military power of an alliance with a population of hundreds of millions.
If unidentified missiles start targeting regular fighters, unidentified missiles will reach Tuapse.
The entire frontline will escalate — thousands of SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles will be directed at the targets from which the aggression originates.
A British and French aircraft carrier will approach — somewhere near Hamburg — to monitor the situation in the port of Kaliningrad if there are casualties among the pilots.
It remains unclear whether this mission will move beyond media discussions and consultations.
But this is no longer a case of 30,000 peacekeepers spread across thousands of kilometres, nor empty promises of weapons and assurances that troops will arrive if something happens.
A clearly defined perimeter — where an attack would trigger the involvement of several of the world’s leading economies — is a stronger deterrent. Because no one will send their best aircraft and highly trained crews, in which they have invested billions, just to be slaughtered.