It is unclear who first used the term “anti-tank,” but in the post-information age, it is not difficult to trace such errors. Still, after ten years of war, it is disappointing to see such misconceptions in the media.
The missiles in question are not “anti-tank” weapons but Martlet lightweight multi-purpose guided missiles, which British Prime Minister Keir Starmer had already mentioned in early March.
Their primary role today is air defence. They are deployed using tripod-mounted systems, tactical armoured vehicles, and MRAPs equipped with Rapid Ranger launchers.
The latter were recently purchased by the Portuguese army – a half-tonne unit featuring an optical channel and automatic target tracking, offering a cost-effective and efficient solution.
At the same time, development continues on additional platforms, including UAVs, boats, and helicopters.
For instance, Martlets are being integrated as onboard weapons for frigates, enabling them to engage moving targets beyond the range of 30 mm guns or those difficult to hit with the ship’s main calibre due to manoeuvrability constraints. Turkish company Aselsan is developing such systems in collaboration with Thales.
Originally, this weapon might have been intended for engagements against the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ light boat forces. Today, however, it serves as a highly adaptable platform – providing a cost-effective solution for battlefield scenarios where traditional anti-aircraft artillery is insufficient, yet more expensive anti-aircraft or anti-ship missiles are unnecessary.
Martlet missiles come with various warhead options:
- Armour-piercing warheads for lightly armoured targets, including self-propelled artillery systems.
- Thermobaric warheads for enclosed spaces and fortifications.
- Reduced fragmentation warheads for scenarios requiring precision strikes without collateral damage to civilians or infrastructure.
Additionally, free-fall variants exist for drones, equipped with airborne fuzing – an effective means of targeting towed artillery, mortars, infantry units, and even unconventional threats like improvised combat vehicles.
The targeting systems include a semi-active laser and an infrared homing head.
The laser is particularly valuable because it is resistant to jamming and can be used against small UAVs when standard homing heads fail to detect them.
Is this supply a betrayal? Definitely not. We have already depleted most of our Javelin stockpile, exhausted a five-year supply of Stingers, received Peruns from Poland, and acquired thousands of Arrows from Eastern and Central European storage, along with countless other pieces of expendable equipment.
To address the shortage of Stingers, the United States has reopened decommissioned Cold War production lines, hired retired veterans, and reloaded hundreds of expired missiles.
No country in the world today can manufacture such weapons in the quantities it desires.
Therefore, the credit line, the partial localisation, and the fact that the production facility is in Ireland—safe from Shahed and Iskander strikes – should be more than satisfactory.
This is a positive development, no matter how you look at it. We already have Starstreak in service, with several hundred missiles delivered.
The LMM (Martlet) and HVM (Starstreak) share the same launchers and are interchangeable. Thanks to their modularity, tactical air defence systems can be adapted for limited over-the-horizon anti-armour roles, but that does not make these missiles anti-tank weapons. Their maximum effectiveness is against self-propelled artillery, towed artillery, and armoured vehicles.
Yes, the warhead is fragmentation-based, capable of striking infantry, boats, and drones, but not tanks. That’s just how it is.
The production line in Belfast will be expanded, new staff will be hired, and nearly 900 people will gain employment – something the British are quite pleased with.
As for the funding being on credit, that is entirely normal. The British themselves paid off their Lend-Lease debts in the early 1990s. It would be absurd to expect them to provide unlimited technology transfers and thousands of missiles simply because we claim to be defending the islands.
Instead of seeing betrayal in financial agreements, we should be asking our authorities more often about vocational school reforms, the potential role of 18–25-year-olds in industrial mobilisation if we want to preserve a generation, and how we have mastered First World War-era technologies, considering the vast stockpiles of mines and light shells available.
The fact that we cannot yet produce tens of thousands of modern missiles does not mean we should focus solely on Chinese drone manufacturers.