In January-February, the Russian military command (specifically, the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel-General Lapin, also known as the Commander of the Sever military unit) focused on replenishing the group with men and equipment. On 20-22 January, two infantry regiments of the DPRK Armed Forces arrived. The enemy created a numerical superiority in the priority areas of the frontline - Mala Loknya, Makarivka, Kurylivka.
The Russians began the decisive stage of liquidating the Ukrainian bridgehead in Kursk Region in late February. Russian military captured the villages of Sverdlikovo and Lebedivka on the western flank, and squeezed Ukrainian units out of Pohrebky and Nova Sorochyna in the north. Navy and Korean infantry captured Kurylivka in the east.
We are forced to state that the Russian military command managed to covertly prepare for the offensive and suddenly launch it, disorienting our command, in particular through the widespread use of electronic warfare equipment that disrupted the communications of the Siversk military unit in the selected areas.
The capture of Nikolskiy hamlet posed a threat to the encirclement of Mala Loknya. Assessing the lack of progress in the Sverdlikove area, General Lapin sent two Korean regiments to break through west of Kurylivka. The Koreans broke through a corridor 9 km long and 2.6 km wide, but suffered such losses that they stopped before the border with Sumy Region.
Russian troops created conditions for a major offensive with all available forces on the western, northern and eastern flanks.
Russians attempted to break through into Sumy Region near the villages of Novenke and Zhuravka to cut off supplies to Siversk via the Yunakivka-Sudzha highway. Up to 1,500 bayonets were used in this attack, but it failed. It should be noted that the border area of Sumy Region was evacuated by mid-2023, the areas were so densely mined that they became impassable for armoured vehicles, bridges were destroyed, roads were turned into impassable or even flooded.
The positions of the Ukrainian Defence Forces in this area are small strongholds and observation posts. In other words, the enemy was trying to penetrate the buffer zone, not the populated area. Such a landscape complicated the logistics of the Siversk military unit, but now it is an obstacle for Russians. As of 7 March, the enemy captured the ruins of the small villages of Zhuravka and Novenke. The point of fighting against Ukrainian logistics finally disappeared the next day.
On the morning of 8 March, the Russian military attacked the positions of the Siversk unit near Mala Loknya, south of Stara Sorochyna, near Cherkaske Porechne and near Makarivka. Up to two battalions of the 810th Marine Brigade, the 177th Marine Regiment and the Koreans who had not been defeated attacked Huyeve and Milova.
It is worth mentioning the pipe here. On 8 March, the enemy launched Operation Potok. There is an assumption that this manoeuvre was prepared in the late February by a group of unit commanders specially summoned from the front line to the headquarters of the Sever military unit.
Actually, "operation" is too strong a word, because the episode was purely tactical, although it had operational consequences for the entire military operation. 460 assault troops from the enemy's 11th Separate Mechanised Brigade, 30th Infantry Division of the 72nd Infantry Division of the 44th AC, "volunteers" from the Veterans brigade of the Volunteer Assault Corps, and the Akhmat-Vostok battalion, passed through the pipe of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod gas pipeline to the rear of Ukrainian positions behind Makarivka and in Sudzha. This manoeuvre allowed them to bypass Ukrainian positions that had not been captured since last autumn.
The assault force emerged in an industrial area on the eastern outskirts of Sudzha, part of it moved southeast along the railway, and part dispersed around the outskirts of the district centre. The main part began to occupy the industrial zone of Suzha. As was the case near Avdiyivka, our troops did not immediately detect the breakthrough, but reacted and launched an artillery attack. The two groups that moved away from the pipe to the southeast and east were quickly dispersed and mostly destroyed. However, they distracted Siversk's attention, allowing the main part of the pipelayers to gain a foothold in the Suzha industrial area.
The command of our garrison in Sudzha was forced to transfer units from Makarivka and Kozatska Lokna to eliminate the breakthrough. They were immediately tied up in combat, as the bulk of the Russian assault force was right on the supply route between the Ukrainian positions in Makarivka and Sudzha. Russian attacks on Cherkaske Porechne and Makarivka further complicated the situation.
By the afternoon of 8 March, the units of the Siversk military unit began to withdraw from Makarivka and Cherkaske Porechne, then Russians occupied both villages and began to advance further. There was a threat of encirclement of our units in Mala Lokna and they also began to retreat to Kozatska Lokna and Sudzha. In early March, Russian aircraft destroyed or damaged almost all bridges on the territory occupied by Siversk unit, so the retreat from Mala Loknya, Cherkaske Porechne and Makarivka was as difficult as possible.
On 9-10 March, the enemy continued to attack Kozacha Loknya from Cherkaske Porechne, occupied several villages along the main road, and tried to break through from Makarivka to the assault unit blocked in the Suzha industrial area.
On the morning of 11 March, Russian forces captured the village of Myrnyy and broke through to the industrial zone. In the evening of 11 March, these combined units launched attacks in the direction of Zamost, Dmytriuky and Kolmaky hamlets to the east of Sudzha. The units of Siversk military unit retreated from Sudzha to Kozacha Loknya.
Formally, 12 March can be considered the end of the Kursk operation of the Siversk military unit. Ukrainian troops are now withdrawing to the territory of Ukraine. Up to 2,300 Ukrainian soldiers are defending the state border.
The Siversk military unit was unable to hold its line of defence, as Russians amassed forces, reaching a ratio of 1:6 to 1:8 for the first time since the start of the operation, and found vulnerabilities in our defence line. The breakthrough to the rear through the gas pipeline with simultaneous attacks on Makarivka and Cherkasy Porechchya created a threat of encirclement of Ukrainian positions near Mala Loknya. Another reason for the defeat was the North Korean breakthrough from Kurylivka, which threatened to bypass Sudzha from the south.
The Kursk operation lasted about nine months. The enemy was forced to increase its grouping by almost five times, deploying the most combat-ready troops — airborne troops and navy — to the Kursk Region, withdrawing them from other areas, which led to stagnation of the front in the Kupyansk, Siversk, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhya, and Prydniprovya directions.
The commanders of the first "counter-terrorist" and then offensive operations deployed the troops arriving for reinforcement right off the wheels, rather than accumulating them for simultaneous use. This led to unjustifiably high losses and minimal progress. Another generator of losses is Putin's alleged desire to liberate the Kursk Region by 9 May. The cost of liberating Kyiv in 1943 by 7 October on another "personal wish" cannot be calculated even today.
To understand the impact of the Kursk operation on the entire front, let's go through its directions.
The Siversk military unit directed the flow of Russian troops from the main areas of the Russian Armed Forces' offensive in Ukraine to the Kursk Region. Pokrovsk direction was the only one to be supplied, which was also resupplied on a residual basis since the beginning of winter. The commander of the Centre military unit of Russian Armed Forces, General Mordvychov, in a lively conversation with his senior superior, first refused to storm Pokrovsk, and then began to move to defence.
москалі рвуться вперед у напрямку Покровська, а якщо точніше, агломерації Покровськ-Мирноград та до дороги, яка з’єднує цю агломерацію і Костянтинівку. Якщо до першої цілі їм ще доволі далеко, то для того, щоб перерізати трасу, лишилося не так і багато.
— Сіль 🇺🇦 (@solonko1648) June 7, 2024
Зараз ідуть жорсткі бої… pic.twitter.com/Ah77driGWe
Toretsk direction. Due to the lack of personnel, the South military unit of Russian Armed Forces has lost its offensive potential and is switching to defence in some places.
In the Kramatorsk direction, the offensive on Kostyantynivka, scheduled for early March, has been postponed, and the 20th and 150th divisions of the 8th Army of the Russian Armed Forces, which were redeployed to Toretsk to attack Konstakha, are forced to fight to regain the positions lost by the 51st Army in February.
In the Kupyansk direction, where the Russians forced Oskil and created a bridgehead near Dvorichna, the Ukrainian Defence Forces launched attacks near Synkivka, which could lead to both the loss of the bridgehead and a serious tactical defeat for the West military unit of Russian Armed Forces due to a lack of personnel.
The Russian offensive in January-February cost the North military unit of Russian Armed Forces 12,000 killed and wounded. Troops of the highly mobile component (airborne troops and marines) will be withdrawn for recuperation.
This is the answer to the question "Why did we go to the Kursk Region?".
After the withdrawal of the Siversk military unit to Ukraine, it is logical to assume that Russians will return the troops to the areas from which they were taken — near Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar.
The reinforcements that will be generated in the future will also go to the same areas. Within 1-2 weeks, Russians could move up to 10-12,000 bayonets to other areas, and within 3-4 weeks — another 15-20. Continued fighting along the state border in the Kursk Region will block significant Russian forces there in the future, so it makes sense for all our troops to stay there. But this is a very difficult and very costly task, primarily in terms of our losses: this foothold is open to attacks from all directions, is completely shelled by all means of destruction, is difficult to secure, and is difficult to evacuate people from. If things go badly for the Defence Forces, Sumy Region will turn into a kind of Krynky for us.