Requests from Russia to the Ukrainian project Hochu Nayti (I want to find), which helps locate missing Russians, have increased. Since the beginning of the year, there have been 8,548 requests, and since the start of the Great War, around 60,000. On the Ukrainian side, the number of missing persons has also risen, which has a logical explanation: we were retreating, leaving the bodies of our fallen comrades in enemy-occupied territory. Expecting savages to comply with international humanitarian law is futile, so the situation will remain this way until they are identified.
In 2024, 692,000 Russians greeted the new year on Ukrainian soil, but only 540,000 were still there by its end. The rest were sent to hell by the Ukrainian Defence Forces. But the world’s best ballet cannot perform with a depleted troupe. The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces reported calling up 370,000 “volunteers” in a year. We have seen them many now lie in fields, forest belts, and ruins along the contact line. To these, Russia added 53,100 amnestied prisoners and 3,900 mercenaries (a curious category – graduates of the “special purpose university” in Gudermes, Chechnya), bringing the total to 427,000.
Smart analysts have found discrepancies in Russia’s budget between allocated funding and the number of contractors who should have received payments. Some interesting findings: prisoners who sign military contracts do not receive payments from the Ministry of Defence, despite being promised money. The “volunteers” in BARS units are unpaid because, as of 2022, they did not have military contracts but rather employment agreements with the MoD, making them ineligible for funeral benefits, compensation, or injury payments. Why break a long-standing tradition and start paying them now? They never lived well, so why start?
The question remains: How, after bringing in 427,000 new recruits, did the Russian force shrink by 152,000 in a year?Since June, Russian losses have outpaced reinforcements. In early autumn, the balance levelled slightly, but by December, it had dipped again. In January 2025, 16,000 autumn conscripts were converted to contract service, giving Putin some pleasing New Year’s statistics. But on the battlefield, we see assault groups filled with soldiers on crutches or heavily bandaged. The Russians have already coined a grim new term for regiments made up of wounded troops sent straight from hospitals to the front: the “cripple regiment.” A telling sign, wouldn’t you agree?
російські «каліч-полки». Поранених окупантів далі женуть на штурми.
— Serhii Sternenko ✙ (@sternenko) September 8, 2024
Якось робив детальний випуск про це явище.
До таких заходів ворог вдається далеко не тому, що в нього все йде добре. pic.twitter.com/Dxpvk8x5Vj
Let’s summarise: as of 1 January 2024, 692,000 Russian troops were fighting against Ukraine on its territory and in surrounding areas. Over the course of the year, another 427,000 arrived, bringing the total to 1,119,000. By year’s end, 540,000 remained. The difference accounts for all categories of losses, including prisoners of war (though their numbers are far lower than those wounded, sick, missing, or deserters). In other words, the enemy lost the majority of its forces in 2024.
How has this affected the frontline? On Deep State maps, we see that the so-called “strategic offensive in the South-Western theatre of war” has fragmented into multiple simultaneous operations, each following a single plan and intent.
For example, advancing from Avdiyivka to Pokrovsk, the enemy lost 35,000 fighters, while the Centregroup of forces shrank from 110,000 to 75,000. The Russian command is now deciding whether to continue towards Pokrovsk or open a new front in the Kostyantynivka direction. The regrouping of the 8th Army, which was relocated from Kurakhove to the Toretsk area, suggests they may choose the latter.
It is also clear that Russia has squandered most, if not all, of its strategic reserves. It will no longer be able to conduct two simultaneous large-scale offensive operations at the army level (the 41st and 2nd Armies near Pokrovsk, the 51st and 8th Armies near Toretsk). Adding to this is the Kremlin’s desire to seize as much Ukrainian land as possible before potential negotiations – pushing them to attack even where it is neither feasible nor logical.
And here lies our opportunity: a sudden, powerful strike on an area where the enemy is exhausted. They may keep attacking, but without reserves, they cannot sustain their momentum. Such weakened areas could collapse entirely.
The only condition? We must have reserves for this.