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Former Royal Navy Officer Warns of Risk of Major Russian Sabotage of Undersea Cables

This infrastructure has virtually no protection against hybrid attacks.

Former Royal Navy Officer Warns of Risk of Major Russian Sabotage of Undersea Cables
Судно прикордонних сил Великої Британії
Photo: EPA/UPG

Tom Sharpe, a former commander of a Royal Navy frigate, said that the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research of Russia’s Ministry of Defence (GUGI) is already completing the preparatory stages for the possible damaging of undersea communications cables.

Sharpe stressed that around 64 cables connect Britain to the outside world, but most traffic depends on only a few of them, the Onet portal writes. 

In particular, two cables provide 75% of transatlantic capacity, and seven cables account for 93% of all UK internet traffic. In addition, nine lines come ashore through a single station in Bude, which has virtually no proper protection against sabotage.

Experts and military officials note that Russia regularly conducts reconnaissance and tests near strategic communications in the Atlantic and off the coast of Svalbard. For sabotage, Russia could use both specialised nuclear-powered submarines such as the “Losharik”, capable of operating at depths of up to 6,000 metres, and cheap unmanned devices packed with explosives.

Simultaneous damage to these networks would lead to the immediate blocking of popular messaging apps, disruptions to banking applications, and the shutdown of the international SWIFT financial system, through which trillions of dollars pass through London every day. In addition, sabotage would completely paralyse NATO and Five Eyes intelligence and command networks.

The situation is compounded by the fact that Britain and its allies have limited capacity for rapid repairs and round-the-clock monitoring of undersea infrastructure. Restoring dozens of damaged cables would take almost a year, so the former officer is urging the UK government to urgently invest in specialist vessels, underwater protection systems and sensor-monitoring technologies.

  • Previously, vessels linked to Russia’s shadow fleet damaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea.
  • For example, in November 2024, an undersea cable between Lithuania and Sweden was damaged.
  • As a result, NATO stepped up patrols in the Baltic Sea due to the threat of sabotage. 
  • Last January, the C-Lion1 undersea cable between Finland and Germany in the Baltic Sea was damaged. It was repaired in March.
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