They are trying to dig in and move under the cover of foliage (“green cover”).
What are you currently observing on the Dobropillia direction? Is the Russian army really planning to make it one of the main axes for a strike in its summer campaign and therefore accumulating personnel and equipment there?
The Russian army is trying to concentrate its troops and groupings along the entire front line. But they also have to bring up reserves, because every day they suffer heavy losses, even when simply trying to establish themselves in settlements. I cannot single out any specific direction here – Dobropillia, Rodynske, Hryshyne, or other points of the Pokrovsk agglomeration. The Russian army is simply attempting assaults, and not so much due to the accumulation of forces, but because weather conditions have improved and “green cover” has appeared. As a result, it is now using light motorized equipment, artillery, and trying to infiltrate in groups and establish positions. However, the Defence Forces, thanks to constant reconnaissance, aerial surveillance, and coordination between units, detect and destroy them in time.
How much have the Russians intensified their activity, how many attacks are being repelled daily?
The situation is changing, because previously the Russian army was trying to establish itself and infiltrate on foot, but now it is using light motorized (and in some cases even military) equipment. Overall, on 4 May alone, our defenders stopped 24 assault actions on the Pokrovsk direction.
Of course, on the Pokrovsk direction, across the entire Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, the Russian army is gathering significant forces. Heavy fighting is taking place in all settlements adjacent to Pokrovsk, but once again: our Defence Forces are holding designated lines, and reconnaissance, artillery, and the Unmanned Systems Forces are actively operating.
What kind of equipment are they using? After motorcycles, buggies, and quad bikes — have they come up with anything new?
No, motorcycles and quad bikes are still being actively used, moving through tree lines and shelterbelts. They also use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), but in smaller numbers. Their main strength remains motorized equipment.
Are UGVs used for assault operations?
No, mostly for delivering ammunition and supplying personnel with necessary resources.
Is heavy equipment no longer being used at all?
If a tank appears, our drone operators detect it immediately, and two or three FPV drones are enough to destroy it. In some cases they still use tanks, but it is no longer as relevant. Their most dangerous means of destruction are now guided and unguided aerial bombs (KABs and FABs). They try to destroy all our fortifications with them. It is fortunate that these weapons are not highly precise. The Russians have a huge stockpile of these bombs, and although they are tracked across all directions, they still create serious problems.
Ukrainian Defence Forces are holding designated lines in the northern part of Pokrovsk
What is happening in Pokrovsk right now?
The Defence Forces are holding designated positions in the northern part of the city. Continuous assault operations are ongoing, and the situation is becoming quite tense in the nearby settlements of Hryshyne and Rodynske, which are adjacent to Pokrovsk. The enemy is trying to accumulate forces, develop its offensive, and entrench itself, but is being destroyed as much as possible.
They are trying to entrench themselves primarily in order to position “Rubicon” units closer to us?
Yes, but there is currently a so-called grey zone, where control shifts back and forth between our forces and theirs. In this grey zone, their drone operators and possibly some infantry groups can temporarily stay. They try to establish positions in buildings and basements. But when supplies such as food are dropped to them, they come out, we track them, and strike them.
They are also trying to create so-called “nests” and dig in. But this requires time, and in modern conditions they simply don’t have it — we monitor everything happening in the contact zone 24/7.
According to the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, over the past five months Russian army losses have consistently exceeded their mobilization rates. Is this felt in practice — do they still have enough people for “meat” assaults?
It is true that the enemy is being destroyed in large numbers and they cannot keep up with mobilizing and minimally training new recruits. But this is an average across the entire front line, and on this direction there is still no clearly noticeable reduction in manpower. In war driven by technology, however, using a huge mass of personnel does not always provide an advantage.
How does the command assess the situation, and what does it expect on this sector of the front in the coming weeks?
We are ready for any actions by the Russian army. Our command is preparing for various contingencies and is considering five or six possible scenarios for how the situation may develop.