Why Kharkiv Region was chosen
At the beginning of August 2022, all the efforts of the Armed Forces were focused on the Kherson front, where an offensive operation had already been under way for a month, albeit with delays and difficulties.
“The President of Ukraine called me and asked me to prepare an offensive operation in the Horlivka area using the forces we had in Khortytsia. And we did not have many,” Syrskyy said. At the time, the Defence Forces were engaged in heavy holding battles on the Bakhmut, Siversk and Avdiyivka fronts.
He proposed planning an operation in a different area where the chances of success were higher. According to the calculations, that was Kharkiv Region, around Balakliya, where Russian forces were not expecting an offensive.
At the same time, 12 Russian battalion tactical groups were concentrated in the Izium area. They had previously suffered losses and been withdrawn for regrouping, while another 11 BTGs of varying levels of readiness were stationed in Belgorod Region.
The strike force consisted of three brigades: the 92nd Mechanised Brigade, the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 80th Air Assault Brigade. It took a month to assemble and prepare them because the battalions were deployed across different sections of the front. In addition, units and formations of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Territorial Defence Forces, National Guard of Ukraine and National Police of Ukraine were brought in to support the brigades’ operations.
“There was nothing to support the offensive”
The plan was to breach the Russian defences and advance rapidly, avoiding heavy fighting for settlements, to reach the right bank of the Oskil – a distance of approximately 65–70 kilometres. The plan was to liberate 3,000 square kilometres and around 120 settlements.
However, when the troops were redeployed on 29 August, there were no ammunition supplies in place.
“The President called and asked why we were not advancing. There was simply nothing to support the offensive with,” Syrskyy said. According to him, artillery was responsible for around 80% of all strikes at the time, while the shortage of shells was so severe that for every 12–15 rounds fired by the Russians, Ukrainian forces could respond with just one.
When this was reported, the President tasked them with finding ammunition and assigned the task to then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov.
How the information blackout was maintained
Only five officers and generals were allowed to know about the operation’s preparations. Each commander received a clear task only when their unit was already moving into the assembly area.
“They knew they would be carrying out some kind of offensive action and were preparing for it, but they received a clear task only when they were moving into the area,” the general explained.
On the first day, the Ukrainian forces breached the defences and advanced 19 kilometres; on the second, they advanced another 29 kilometres; and on the third day, they reached the banks of the Oskil. Once it became clear that the Russians were withdrawing, the 92nd Brigade was tasked with advancing towards Kupyansk, while on the fifth day another part of the force encircled Izium.
Among the operations carried out as part of the wider offensive, Syrskyy highlighted the capture of the 65th Arsenal in Balakliya. Ukrainian forces managed to seize it before the Russians could blow up the ammunition depots.
Experience applied in the Kursk operation
According to the general, the experience of the Kharkiv operation was put into practice several times, including in Kursk Region in 2024.
“All the same principles: advancing on armoured vehicles, bypassing strongpoints and pushing deep into enemy territory,” he said. In response, the Russians were forced to deploy their best units to the area – marines and airborne troops – with almost 70,000 personnel redeployed from other fronts.
Four elements have remained unchanged: a limited circle of people involved in planning, issuing tasks at the last possible moment, surprise and complete silence in the media. According to him, the most recent such operation was conducted in 2026 on the Oleksandrivka front, starting on 29 January, and the country’s leadership was persuaded not to cover it in the media.
“Of course, we make adjustments for the increasing role of technology, given that drones effectively dictate and control the situation both on the ground and in the air. But the fundamental principle remains the same,” Syrskyy said.
The general identified air defence as the key issue in protecting civilians and infrastructure. According to him, the situation with supplies of Patriot missiles from partners is difficult, and the only solution is to develop a domestic anti-ballistic missile system.
“The development of a Ukrainian-made missile to counter Russian aircraft and cruise missiles is already at the final stage. It is literally a matter of one or two months. The final tests are already under way,” he said.
The next step is jet-powered drones. According to him, the procurement of light aircraft capable of countering them is being delayed: the Defence Ministry is making decisions and the process has now got under way. A large number of MANPADS are also needed as a relatively inexpensive way of countering drones, along with the modernisation of conventional weapons.
The role and effectiveness of armoured vehicles, and the conditions for their use
According to General Syrskyy, drones are currently prevailing in the contest between offensive and defensive capabilities. However, both sides are working on active protection systems for armoured vehicles, and the latest Ukrainian developments have shown results: active protection systems have intercepted 60–80% of FPV drones.
“When these measures are fully developed, the use of armoured vehicles will once again become relevant, and the pace of offensive operations will change,” the general said.
On the Assault Forces
According to Oleksandr Syrskyy, the Assault Forces have been demonstrating their effectiveness for almost three years. This is particularly evident in difficult situations, where they support offensive operations and prevent the loss of territory.
He believes their main contribution has been relieving the Air Assault Forces. “Previously, only the Air Assault Forces carried out these operations, and in fact, especially during the first and second years of the war, they were used to cover all the problematic areas,” the general said. He believes this is no longer the case.
It was at that point that the concept for developing the Assault Forces was drawn up. Two months before the relevant decisions on the command structure of these forces were adopted, the creation of the Joint Rapid Response Forces was announced to address the problems facing the Assault Forces.
According to Syrskyy, the problem is that these forces comprise a huge number of regiments and battalions, personnel, equipment and weapons that need to be managed systematically. But while formally part of the Ground Forces, these units were effectively locked into a permanent cycle of active combat operations.
“No unit was withdrawn to restore its combat capability, and if a unit was withdrawn, half of it was still carrying out a combat mission,” he said.
Robotisation and the role of humans
Oleksandr Syrskyy described robotisation as a trend that will spread across all areas. In the future, infantry soldiers will receive additional mechanised equipment, including mechanical and electric exoskeletons, while the military will be equipped with various types of UGVs, including humanoid and four-legged cargo robots.
But humans will remain. As an example, he cited a prediction made by Americans in the 1990s that 70% of combat aircraft would be unmanned by 2020, while aircraft are still piloted today.
As for artificial intelligence, it is developing rapidly and is being used both in weapons and in operational planning. “The task is not to lose control over it,” Syrskyy stressed.
How cooperation with partners has changed
“By the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026, all representatives of the armed forces of partner countries, including the UK, France and others, recognised that they now needed to learn from us,” Oleksandr Syrskyy said. Whereas they previously trained Ukrainian troops, they now come to study our experience.
He described Ukraine’s role as decisive: as long as the Defence Forces are holding back Russia, it cannot launch aggression against NATO countries. Intelligence indicates that Russia is preparing for this, but given the losses it has suffered on the battlefield, the question remains whether it will be ready to do so.
