Air defence wipeout and Crimea sweep
In the first two weeks of March, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces knocked out 19 enemy air defence systems — a real jackpot. Among those hit were heavy S-300V systems, Pantsir units, and Tor complexes.
To grasp the pace: in just one night, on 6 March, on the Zaporizhzhya axis, they wiped out four self-propelled components of air defence systems in a single strike.
All layers of the echeloned air defence system have been knocked out — long-range (capable of intercepting ballistic targets), medium-range, and short-range. Five Pantsir systems alone, each worth about $20 million, have been destroyed.
The DIU special unit “Prymara” (“Ghosts”) published a detailed report on the systematic destruction of radar systems in Crimea. The most expensive “eyes” of the enemy have been officially confirmed destroyed: Podlyot, Sopka-2, P-18 Terek, Kasta-2E2 radar stations, as well as ground-based relays used for Shahed drones.
In effect, the radar coverage dome over the peninsula no longer physically exists.
Logistical chokehold and fuel starvation
On 14 March, the Defence Forces struck the Kerch crossing. They completely disabled the Slavyanin railway ferry, which transported fuel and equipment echelons, and severely damaged the Avangard vessel. The main “artery” has been cut — repairs will take months, just as after the first strike.
Also on 14 March, there was a targeted strike on the Kavkaz port infrastructure near Chushka Spit. This is the main supply point for the southern grouping and Crimea.
On 12 and 15 March — in just four days — the strategic Transneft oil depot in Tikhoretsk was hit twice. Satellite imagery shows fires and destroyed storage tanks. This is a key transfer hub. The targeting of oil storage and transit continues.
On 10 March, local fuel and lubricants depots in occupied Makiyivka and Koptev were hit. Fuel is being destroyed at all levels: from large rear bases to frontline tanks.
Strikes on military-industrial complex and bases
On 10 March, drones successfully illuminated incoming cruise missiles targeting the microelectronics plant “Kremniy El” in Bryansk. This is a critical node in producing components for their missiles and air defence systems. Panic ensued in Russia — the country’s second-largest military electronics plant was struck, no interceptions, direct hits on the workshops wiped out shifts and destroyed scarce machinery.
Think about it — how many Bryansks could the EU build in a week?
On 12 March, there was a strike on infrastructure at Donetsk airport, a regular launch point for enemy attack drones. The hit was precise and devastating.
At the time of writing, the Rosneft oil depot in Labinsk (Krasnodar Region) has been burning for hours. Local emergency services are powerless: it’s a classic full burnout, foam suppressants are insufficient, and fire crews are afraid to approach closely due to risk of secondary strikes and detonation.
Reasons for successes — structural, technological, and tactical growth
The system now works on multiple levels.
Relay “mothers” and horizon bypassing — a heavy copter-relay hovers several kilometres from the launch base, extending FPV working range from 5–10 km to 30–40 km. Logistics and rear columns are now targeted deep behind the front line, where they previously felt safe.
Satellite communications — heavy strike drones and naval UAVs are equipped with Starlink terminals. This provides a stable control channel and real-time telemetry hundreds of kilometres deep in the enemy rear, beyond the reach of ground towers. The enemy, who previously broadcast footage of our struck trains, lost that option. We now stream video of burning wagons and disrupted logistics deep in their territory.
Terminal auto-targeting — on approach to the target, where electronic warfare is at full power, the operator no longer needs to manually guide the drone. They simply mark a tank, air defence system, or oil depot tank on the screen. Even if the signal drops, the drone continues autonomously like a guided missile. Jamming it is pointless.
Optical navigation without GPS (DSM) — long-range drones fly in radio-silent mode. Their memory contains a terrain map, and a bottom camera compares the view with the ground. Electronic warfare cannot see or mislead the drone by falsifying coordinates.
Scaling and standardisation of warheads — from attaching RPG grenades with tape, we have moved to powerful factory-produced warheads.
For targeting purposes, thermobaric and incendiary warheads are used against refineries and fuel depots to create volumetric explosions inside tanks. For bunkers and armored targets, tandem and high-explosive fragmentation warheads with high armor penetration are employed.
Increased payload — middle-range and long-range kamikaze missiles (such as the FP-1 ‘Lutyy’) now carry not 5–10 kg, but 50, 75 or more kilograms of explosives. A single direct hit by such a warhead on a rectification column shuts down the plant for a long time. In terms of destructive power, this is now comparable to a cruise missile. When we began using them at medium range, this became a serious threat to air defence.
The strikes are scaled because the system has learned to overcome obstacles both hardware- and software-wise: cheap mass swarms to exhaust air defenses, decoys, heavy warheads, and bypassing electronic warfare through machine vision and satellite links.
It’s essentially a mathematical algorithm multiplied by the experience of Ukrainian pilots. The Soviet-era concept of layered air defense simply isn’t designed to handle this. Corridors are punched through, radar “eyes” are blinded, channels overloaded—and into the resulting gaps in enemy rear areas fly cruise missiles and long-range drones carrying 50+ kg warheads.